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Abstract—With fast growth of wireless services, secrecy has
become an increasingly important issue for wireless networks. In
this paper, we investigate the secrecy capacity of the primary
system in a cognitive radio system based on artificial noise,
which has been proposed to deal with the eavesdropper. We first
consider a special case of one eavesdropper and two regimes
of the eavesdropping channel condition. Specifically, we analyze
the impact of interference generated by a secondary system
towards the primary system in a cognitive radio system. The
channel state information of the primary channel is assumed
to be perfectly known at both the primary transmitter and
receiver, whereas that for the eavesdropper is partially known.
Under these assumptions, we derive analytical expressions for
the ergodic secrecy capacity in the cases of strong eavesdropping
channel and weak eavesdropping channel, and analyze the
impact of the secondary system on the primary ergodic secrecy
capacity. Moreover, we extend the analysis to the general case of
arbitrary eavesdropping channel condition and arbitrary number
of eavesdroppers. Some numerical results will also be presented
to verify the analysis.
Index Terms—Artificial noise, channel state information, cog-
nitive radio, interference, secrecy capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio is considered as a promising solution to
improve spectrum utilization in wireless networks, as the radio
spectrum becomes crowded and scarce. In a cognitive radio
network, secondary users are allowed to use the frequency
bands of the primary user only when these bands are not
occupied [1], [2]. Therefore, the secondary user needs to figure
out whether a certain frequency band is in use or not using
spectrum sensing and/or geo-location database. In practice,
however, either spectrum sensing or geo-location database
may not always provide correct information on the spectrum
occupancy. Once the secondary user comes to use a certain
band that the primary user is using, they will cause co-
channel interference to each other. Hence, it is of significant
importance to deal with the potential interference between the
primary and secondary users in cognitive radio networks.
On the other hand, maintaining secrecy of information is
critical for wireless networks, as wireless devices become
pervasive and personalized. The general purpose of secure
communication is to guarantee that the legitimate receivers
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can obtain the right message, while the others cannot. Tra-
ditionally, the secrecy mechanism has been established at
the upper layers using a secret key exchange between the
source and destination, such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange
[3], independently of the physical medium. However, the
key exchange algorithm may be vulnerable to eavesdropping
attacks in wireless networks, due to the broadcast nature of
wireless channel. To solve this problem, information-theoretic
security as a physical-layer approach has been widely studied
as a means for providing secure wireless communication [4]–
[7]. A pioneering work by Wyner has shown that perfect
secrecy can be attained when an eavesdropper channel is a
degraded version of the main source-to-destination channel
[4]. One approach realizing the physical layer security relies
on the use of cooperative relays [5], [6], [8]. Another approach
that eliminates the reliance on relays is based on the use
of beamforming technique combined with the injection of
artificial noise [7], [9].
The security issues on the physical layer was introduced
in [10] for a cognitive radio network. The secrecy capacity
of the secondary system was investigated in [11]–[13], where
multiple antennas was exploited to protect the transmit signal
from the eavesdropper in cognitive radio networks. In [14],
a multiuser scheduling scheme was developed to enhance
cognitive transmission security against eavesdropping attacks.
A maximum achievable rate at which information can be
transmitted secretly from the source to its intended destination
is referred to as secrecy capacity [15]. In the context of the
secrecy capacity, it plays a crucial role whether the channel
state information (CSI) of the eavesdropper is available at the
source or not. The CSI of the eavesdropper may be accurately
known at the source in the case that the eavesdropper is active
[15]. In [16], the secrecy capacity of a cognitive radio network
was analyzed under the assumption of perfect CSI for the
eavesdropper. In realistic environments, however, it is hard to
obtain the CSI of the eavesdropper, since the eavesdropper is
generally passive and its location is unknown to the transmitter.
For these reasons, some previous studies assumed that only
partial knowledge on the eavesdropper channel is available
at the transmitter [17]. However, the authors in [17] did not
consider a cognitive radio network where interference between
the primary and secondary systems is present. They also
ignored the noise at the eavesdropper, leading to the conclusion
that the capacity at eavesdroppers depends only on the number
of eavesdroppers, but it is independent of the signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) at the eavesdropper.
In this paper, we first consider a cognitive radio network
when there exists an eavesdropper that can overhear the trans-
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Fig. 1. A cognitive radio network model with N eavesdroppers.
missions from the primary user and from the secondary user.
The primary system is assumed to adopt artificial noise and
transmit beamforming as a security provisioning mechanism.
We derive the secrecy capacity of the primary system in the
presence of a secondary system. In particular, we derive exact
closed-form expressions for the ergodic secrecy capacity as
well as the probability density function (PDF) of the signal-
to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR), in two extreme cases
where the eavesdropping channel is very strong and very
weak. Based on the derived capacity formula, the impact of
the secondary system on the secrecy capacity of the primary
system is analyzed. In particular, we point out that when the
eavesdropper is very far from the primary system, the use of
artificial noise is not effective to protect the primary system
from eavesdropping. Furthermore, we extend the analysis to
the general case of arbitrary eavesdropping channel condition
and arbitrary number of eavesdroppers. It is found that the
use of artificial noise is effective, unless all the eavesdroppers
are far from the primary system. We also discuss how the
optimal power allocation for the artificial noise is affected
by the SNR at the eavesdroppers and interference from the
secondary system as well as by the number of eavesdroppers.
Some numerical results will be presented to verify the analysis.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes a cognitive radio network model with an eavesdrop-
per. In Section III, the ergodic secrecy capacity of the primary
system is derived for the cognitive radio network in two
extreme cases where the eavesdropping channel is very strong
and very weak, and the impact of the secondary system is
analyzed. In Section IV, the analysis is extended to the general
case of arbitrary eavesdropping channel condition and arbitrary
number of eavesdroppers. In Section V, some numerical results
are provided and discussed. Finally, conclusions are drawn in
Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Cognitive Radio Network
We consider a cognitive radio network model with a primary
system, a secondary system, and N eavesdroppers (Eav’s),
as illustrated in Fig. 1. In this model, we assume that the
primary transmitter (Pr-Tx) is equipped with M antennas,
while the secondary transmitter (Se-Tx), primary receiver (Pr-
Rx), and each eavesdropper are, respectively, equipped with
a single antenna. It should be noted that the case of a single
eavesdropper will be considered up to Section III, and the
result will be extended to an arbitrary number of eavesdroppers
in Section IV. The Se-Tx is assumed to employ an energy
detector to sense the spectrum and decide on the status of the
spectrum. Let E denote the test statistic for the energy detector.
Then, the probability of false alarm for the energy detector is
given as [18]
PF = Pr{E > ζ|H0} =
∫ ∞
ζ
pE(ǫ|H0)dǫ, (1)
where ζ denotes the decision threshold, H0 indicates the
hypothesis that the primary system is inactive, and pE(ǫ|H0)
denotes the conditional PDF of E under the hypothesis H0.
Similarly, the probability of detection can be computed as
PD = Pr{E > ζ|H1} =
∫ ∞
ζ
pE(ǫ|H1)dǫ, (2)
where H1 indicates the hypothesis that the primary system is
active, and pE(ǫ|H1) denotes the conditional PDF of E under
the hypothesis H1. Let Θ denote the event that the secondary
system is present (Θ = 1) or absent (Θ = 0) in the band, under
the condition that the primary system is active (hypothesis
H1). Then, Θ follows the Bernoulli distribution as
Θ =
{
0 with probability P0 = PD,
1 with probability P1 = 1− P0. (3)
The received signals at the Pr-Rx and at the Eav can be
expressed as
yp =
√
γpp
M
hppxp +Θ
√
γsphspxs + np, (4)
ye =
√
γpe
M
hpexp +Θ
√
γsehsexs + ne, (5)
where xp ∈ CM×1 and xs ∈ C are the signal transmitted from
the Pr-Tx and Se-Tx, respectively, and they satisfy the power
constraints 1
M
E{x†pxp} = 1 and E{x†sxs} = 1. hpp ∈ C1×M
and hpe ∈ C1×M are fading channel gains from the Pr-Tx to
the Pr-Rx and from the Pr-Tx to the Eav, respectively, such
that hpp ∼ CN (0, IM ) and hpe ∼ CN (0, IM )1. Similarly,
hsp ∈ C and hse ∈ C are fading channel gains from the Se-Tx
to the Pr-Rx and from the Se-Tx to the Eav, respectively, such
that hsp ∼ CN (0, 1) and hse ∼ CN (0, 1). np ∼ CN (0, 1) and
ne ∼ CN (0, 1) are additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at
the Pr-Rx and at the Eav, respectively. γpp and γpe are the
average SNR at the Pr-Rx and at the Eav, respectively, for the
signal transmitted by the Pr-Tx. Similarly, γsp and γse are the
average SNR at the Pr-Rx and at the Eav, respectively, for the
signal transmitted by the Se-Tx.
B. Artificial Noise
The use of artificial noise for secure communication has
been proposed by Goel [7]. We assume that the Pr-Tx exploits
artificial noise in combination with beamforming. The trans-
mitter composes xp as a weighted sum of information bearing
1CN (0,Σ) denotes complex Gaussian distribution with zero mean and
covariance matrix Σ.
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signal sp ∈ C and an artificial noise signal wp ∈ C(M−1)×1.
Note that the power of sp and wp are normalized such that
E{|sp|2} = 1 and wp ∼ CN (0, IM−1). Accordingly, xp can
be expressed as
xp =
√
φupsp +
√
1− φ
M − 1Wpwp, (6)
where φ denotes the ratio of the power of information bearing
signal to the total power P : P = σ2s+(M−1)σ2w, where σ2s =
φP and σ2w = (1 − φ)P/(M − 1) with σ2s and σ2w denoting
the signal power and the variance of each component of the
artificial noise, respectively. The beamforming vector up in (6)
is designed to maximize the power of the information bearing
signal at the intended destination, such that up = h†pp/ ‖hpp‖,
while the nulling matrix Wp ∈ CM×(M−1) is chosen such that
hpp lies in the left-hand null space of Wp, i.e., hppWp = 0.
With xp defined in (6), the received signals in (4) and (5)
can be rewritten as
yp =
√
φγpp
M
‖hpp‖ sp +Θ√γsphspxs + np (7)
ye =
√
φγpe
M
ψIsp+
√
1− φ
M − 1
γpe
M
ψAwp+Θ
√
γsehsexs+ne
(8)
where ψI , hpeup ∈ C is associated with the information
bearing signal, and ψA , hpeWp ∈ C1×(M−1) is associated
with the artificial noise. From (7), we can see that xs, which is
transmitted when spectrum sensing fails at the Se-Tx, causes
interference to the primary system. From (8), we can also
observe that Eav can attempt to decode sp, subject to the
artificial noise and interference from the secondary system.
Thus, the primary, secondary, and eavesdropper systems are
all coupled to one another. Correspondingly, it is not apparent
whether the use of artificial noise always benefits the primary
system in the presence of secondary system and eavesdropper.
III. ERGODIC SECRECY CAPACITY OF THE PRIMARY
SYSTEM
In this section, we derive the secrecy capacity of the
primary system described in Section II. In the derivation, we
assume that the Pr-Rx has perfect knowledge on the CSI
for hpp and hsp, while the Eav knows only the statistics
of the channels hpe and hse. We will consider two extreme
cases, weak eavesdropping channel and strong eavesdropping
channel, according to the channel condition between the Pr-
Tx and Eav, represented by γpe. The secrecy capacity will be
provided in Theorems 1 and 2 for the two cases.
The secrecy capacity of primary system, denoted as Cs, is
defined as [19]
Cs = max {Cp − Ce, 0} = (Cp − Ce)+ , (9)
where Cp is the ergodic capacity of the primary system, and
Ce is the ergodic capacity of the eavesdropping channel, i.e.,
the channel between Pr-Tx and Eav. From (7), the ergodic
capacity of primary system with perfect CSI is given as
Cp = EΘ{log2[1 + SINRp]}, (10)
where SINRp is the SINR at the Pr-Rx for decoding sp, given
as
SINRp =
(
φ
γpp
M
) ‖hpp‖2
1 + γspΘ |hsp|2
. (11)
By substituting (11) into (10) and using (3), we obtain the
ergodic capacity as
Cp = P0 log2
(
1 + φ
γpp
M
‖hpp‖2
)
+ P1 log2
(
1 +
(
φ
γpp
M
) ‖hpp‖2
1 + γsp |hsp|2
)
.
(12)
Remark 1: From (12), we can see that γsp represents the
effect of the interference from the Se-Tx to the Pr-Rx, and Cs
decreases as γsp increases. Specifically, we have
lim
γsp→0
Cp = P0Cp|Θ=0 + P1Cp|Θ=0 = Cp|Θ=0,
lim
γsp→∞
Cp = P0Cp|Θ=0 + P0 · 0 = P0Cp|Θ=0.
(13)
Remark 1 shows that if γsp increases from 0 to ∞,
Cs decreases by at most the quantity max∆Cs =
max∆Cp = P1Cp|Θ=0. Moreover, it is known that Cp|Θ=0 =
1
ln 2 exp
(
M
φγpp
)∑M
m=1Em
(
M
φγpp
)
[17], where Em (·) de-
notes the generalized exponential integral. This indicates that
max∆Cs increases with M , φ, and γpp. The influence of φ
on ∆Cs will be discussed in Section V.
On the other hand, from (8), the ergodic capacity of the
primary-Eav channel with knowledge on the statistics of the
eavesdropping channel is given by
Ce = EΘ,hse,ψI ,ψA{log2[1 + SINRe]}
= P0Ehse,ψI ,ψA{log2[1 + SINRe|Θ=0]}
+ P1Ehse,ψI ,ψA{log2[1 + SINRe|Θ=1]},
(14)
where SINRe is the SINR at the Eav for decoding sp, given
as
SINRe =
(
φ
γpe
M
) |ψI |2
1 + γseΘ |hse|2 + 1−φM−1 γpeM ‖ψA‖2
. (15)
A. Case of Weak Eavesdropping Channel (γpe ≪ 1)
Theorem 1: In the case that the Pr-Tx is very far from the
Eav (γpe ≪ 1), the ergodic secrecy capacity of the primary
system with perfect instantaneous CSI of the legitimate chan-
nel is given as
Cs =
(
P0 log2
(
1 + φ
γpp
M
‖hpp‖2
)
+ P1 log2
(
1 +
(
φ
γpp
M
) ‖hpp‖2
1 + γsp |hsp|2
)
− P0
ln 2
e
M
φγpeE1
(
M
φγpe
)
− P1
ln 2
1
1− α
{
e
M
φγpeE1
(
M
φγpe
)
− e 1γseE1
(
1
γse
)})+
,
(16)
where α , Mγse
φγpe
and E1(u) ,
∫∞
1
e−utt−1dt.
Proof: After dividing both the numerator and denomi-
nator of (15) by γpe, let γpe go to 0. Then, we can easily
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see that the third term in the denominator can be neglected,
since ‖ψA‖2 associated with the artificial noise will be finite.
Therefore, when γpe ≪ 1, SINRe in (15) is approximated as
SINRe ≈ X =
(
φ
γpe
M
) |ψI |2
1 + γseΘ |hse|2
. (17)
The PDF of X can be found as fX (x) = P0fX (x|Θ = 0) +
P1fX (x|Θ = 1), where
fX (x|Θ = 0) = M
φγpe
e
− M
φγpe
x
,
fX (x|Θ = 1) = M
φγpe
e
− M
φγpe
x
{(
1 +
Mγse
φγpe
x
)−1
+ γse
(
1 +
Mγse
φγpe
x
)−2}
.
(18)
See Appendix A for more details. Using (18), Ce in (14) can
be approximated as
Ce = P0Ce|Θ=0 + P1Ce|Θ=1
=
P0
ln 2
e
M
φγpeE1
(
M
φγpe
)
+
P1
ln 2
1
1− α
{
e
M
φγpeE1
(
M
φγpe
)
− e 1γseE1
(
1
γse
)}
,
(19)
where
Ce|Θ=0 =
∫ ∞
0
log2(1 + x)fX (x|Θ = 0)dx
=
1
ln 2
e
M
φγpeE1
(
M
φγpe
)
,
Ce|Θ=1 =
∫ ∞
0
log2(1 + x)fX (x|Θ = 1)dx
=
1
ln 2
1
1− α
{
e
M
φγpeE1
(
M
φγpe
)
− e 1γseE1
(
1
γse
)}
.
(20)
See Appendix B for more details. From (12) and (19), the
ergodic secrecy capacity in (9) is computed as (16).
Corollary 1: From (19) and (20), we get
lim
γse→0
Ce = P0Ce|Θ=0 + P1Ce|Θ=0 = Ce|Θ=0,
lim
γse→∞
Ce = P0Ce|Θ=0 + P0 · 0 = P0Ce|Θ=0.
(21)
According to Corollary 1, if γse changes from 0 to ∞,
the Cs can improve by at most the quantity max∆Cs =
max∆Ce = P1Ce|Θ=0. Moreover, from (20) we can see that
Ce|Θ=0 ≪ 1ln 2e2E1(2) ≈ 0.521, since ezE1(z) decreases
with z , M/(φγpe) ≫ M/φ ≥ 2. Therefore, the quantity
max∆Cs ≪ 0.521P1 is not significant.
Corollary 2: Observing (19) and (20), we see that Ce|Θ=0
and Ce|Θ=1 increase with φ, as e
M
φγpeE1
(
M
φγpe
)
increases
with φ.
The Corollary 2 implies that in low γpe regime, employing
artificial noise is not effective to protect the primary user
from eavesdropping. However, this will not be the case when
there are many eavesdroppers, as discussed in [16], or when
there are amplifying relays between the primary user and
eavesdropper, as discussed in [7].
B. Case of Strong Eavesdropping Channel (γpe ≫ 1)
Theorem 2: Assuming that the Pr-Tx is very close to the
Eav (γpe ≫ 1), the ergodic secrecy capacity of the primary
system with perfect instantaneous CSI of the legitimate chan-
nel is given as
Cs =
(
P0 log2
(
1 + φ
γpp
M
‖hpp‖
2
)
+ P1 log2
(
1 +
φ
γpp
M
‖hpp‖
2
1 + γsp |hsp|
2
)
−
P0
ln 2
1− φ
φ
IM (η)−
P1
ln 2
{
A lnα
α(α− 1)
+
M∑
k=2
BkIk(η)
})+
,
(22)
where
η ,
1
M − 1
1− φ
φ
,
A , (α− η)
(
1− η
α
)−M
,
Bk , (1− k)(α− η)
(
1− α
η
)−2 (
1− η
α
)k−M
,
Ik(η) ,

1
(k−1)2
, if η = 1,
(1−η)1−k
(k−1)η
[
− ln η +∑k−2i=1 (k−2)!(−η)i(k−i−2)!i!i (η−i − 1)] ,
otherwise.
(23)
Proof: After dividing both the numerator and denomina-
tor of (15) by γpe, let γpe go to∞. Then, we can easily see that
the first term in the denominator can be neglected. Therefore,
when γpe ≫ 1, the SINRe in (15) can be approximated as
SINRe ≈ Y =
φ
γpe
M
|ψI |2
γseΘ |hse|2 + 1−φM−1 γpeM ‖ψA‖2
. (24)
The PDF of Y can be expressed as fY(y) = P0fY(y|Θ =
0) + P1fY(y|Θ = 1), where
fY(y|Θ = 0) = 1− φ
φ
(
1 + 1−φ
φ(M−1)y
)M ,
fY(y|Θ = 1) = α+ (M − 1)η +Mαηy
(1 + αy)
2
(1 + ηy)
M
.
(25)
See Appendix A for more details. Using (25), Ce in (14) can
be expressed as
Ce = P0Ce|Θ=0 + P1Ce|Θ=1
=
P0
ln 2
1− φ
φ
IM (η) + P1
ln 2
(
A lnα
α(α− 1) +
M∑
k=2
BkIk(η)
)
,
(26)
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where
Ce|Θ=0 =
∫ ∞
0
log2(1 + y)fY(y|Θ = 0)dy
=
1
ln 2
1− φ
φ
IM (η),
Ce|Θ=1 =
∫ ∞
0
log2(1 + y)fY(y|Θ = 1)dy
=
1
ln 2
(
A lnα
α(α− 1) +
M∑
k=2
BkIk(η)
)
.
(27)
See Appendix B for more details. By substituting (12) and
(26) into (9), we arrive at the desired result (22).
Corollary 3: For γse ≪ γpe , the term associated to γse in
the denominator of (15) can be eliminated, which is equivalent
to setting Θ = 0.
It should be noted that the disappearance of Θ in (15) does
not mean that the secondary system disappears. The setting
Θ = 0 results in SINRe|Θ=0 = SINRe|Θ=1 if γse ≪ γpe.
Consequently, Ce in (14) also becomes equal to Ce|Θ=0:
lim γse
γpe
→0SINRe = SINRe|Θ=0 ⇒limγse
γpe
→0 Ce = Ce|Θ=0 and
Cs→
(
Cp − Ce|Θ=0
)+
.
IV. MULTIPLE EAVESDROPPERS
In Section III, the ergodic secrecy capacity of the primary
system has been derived for two extreme cases of the SNR for
the eavesdropping channel condition: γpe ≪ 1 and γpe ≫ 1,
and only one eavesdropper is assumed to exist. In this section,
we extend the result to the general case of arbitrary eavesdrop-
ping channel condition and arbitrary number of eavesdroppers.
Let N (N ≥ 1) denote the number of eavesdroppers, and γpe,n
and SINRe,n , Zn, respectively, denote the average SNR and
instantaneous SINR at the n-th Eav for the signal transmitted
by the Pr-Tx. For simplicity but without loss of generality, we
assume that all the Eav’s have the same SNR for the signal
transmitted by the Se-Tx: γse,1 = γse,2 = · · · = γse,N = γse.
The ergodic capacity of the compound wiretap channel, Ce,
is defined as [8], [20]
Ce , max
n
Ce,n = EΘ,hse,ψI ,ψA{log2[1 + maxn Zn]}. (28)
Let Z , maxnZn. Assuming that N eavesdropping channels
are independent, the cumulative distribution function (CDF)
of Z can be written as
FZ(z) = Pr (Z < z) =
N∏
n=1
FZn(z), (29)
where FZn(z) denotes the CDF of Zn.
Theorem 3: When there exist N eavesdroppers, the er-
godic secrecy capacity of the primary system with perfect
instantaneous CSI of the legitimate channel is given as
Cs =
(
P0 log2
(
1 + φ
γpp
M
‖hpp‖2
)
+ P1 log2
(
1 +
φ
γpp
M
‖hpp‖2
1 + γsp |hsp|2
)
− P0
ln 2
KJ0 − P1
ln 2
K{J1 + J2}
)+
,
(30)
where
K =
N∑
j=1
(−1)j−1
N∑
n1=···=nj=1
n1<···<nj
,
J0 =
∞∑
k=0
(−1)k
µkj
k!
1
ηkΓ ((M − 1)j)
×
(
µjG
2,3
3,3
(
1
η
∣∣∣∣ −k,1,1(M−1)j−k−1,1,0)
+ηG 2,33,3
(
1
η
∣∣∣∣ −k,1,1(M−1)j−k,1,0)) ,
J1 =
∞∑
k=0
L1∑
p1=1
rp1∑
q1=1
(−1)kA1,p1,q1
µkj
k!
θk−q1p1
Γ (q1)
×
(
µjθp1G
2,3
3,3
(
θp1
∣∣∣ −k,1,1q1−k−1,1,0)+G 2,33,3 (θp1 ∣∣∣ −k,1,1q1−k,1,0)) ,
J2 =
∞∑
k=0
∑˜ L2∑
p2=1
rp2∑
q2=1
(−1)kA2,p2,q2
µkj
k!
θk−q2p2
Γ (q2)
×
(
µjθp2G
2,3
3,3
(
θp2
∣∣∣ −k,1,1q2−k−1,1,0)+G 2,33,3 (θp2 ∣∣∣ −k,1,1q2−k,1,0)) ,
µj ,
M
φγ¯pe,j
, γ¯pe,j ,
(
j∑
t=1
1
γpe,nt
)−1
,
∑˜
=
j∑
t=1
M∑
k1=2
M∑
k2=2
· · ·
M∑
kj=2
.
(31)
Note that A1,p1,q1 and A2,p2,q2 in (31) are defined in Ap-
pendix A, and that Gm,np,q
(
x
∣∣∣ a1,··· ,apb1,··· ,bq ) and Γ (x) denote the
Meijer G-function [21, Eq. (9.301)] and gamma function [21,
Eq. (8.310)], respectively.
Proof: In the general case, the SINR of the n-th Eav in
(15) is given as
Zn =
(
φ
γpe,n
M
) |ψI |2
1 + γseΘ |hse|2 + 1−φM−1 γpe,nM ‖ψA‖2
. (32)
The conditional CDF of Zn can be found as
FZn(z|Θ = 0) = 1− e−
M
φγpe,n
z
(ηz + 1)
−M+1
,
FZn(z|Θ = 1) = 1− e−
M
φγpe,n
z
[
An
αn (αnz + 1)
+
M∑
k=2
Bk,n
η (ηz + 1)
k−1
]
.
(33)
Note that if we approximate (33) under the assumption of
γpe ≪ 1 and γpe ≫ 1 and differentiate the equations with
respect to z, we can get (18) and (25). Using (29), the PDF
of Z can be computed from fZ(z) = P0fZ(z|Θ = 0) +
P1fZ(z|Θ = 1), where
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fZ(z|Θ = 0)
= Ke−µjz (ηz + 1)−(M−1)j−1 [µj(ηz + 1) + (M − 1)jη] ,
fZ(z|Θ = 1)
= Ke−µjz
(
L1∑
p1=1
rp1∑
q1=1
A1,p1,q1
(z + θp1)
q1
(
µj +
q1
(z + θp1)
)
+
∑˜ L2∑
p2=1
rp2∑
q2=1
A2,p2,q2
(z + θp2)
q2
(
µj +
q2
(z + θp2)
))
.
(34)
See Appendix A for more details on the derivation of the
conditional PDF’s in (34). Using (34), Ce in (14) can be
expressed as
Ce = P0Ce|Θ=0 + P1Ce|Θ=1
=
P0
ln 2
KJ0 + P1
ln 2
K (J1 + J2) ,
(35)
where
Ce|Θ=0 =
∫ ∞
0
log2(1 + z)fZ(z|Θ = 0)dz =
1
ln 2
KJ0,
Ce|Θ=1 =
∫ ∞
0
log2(1 + z)fZ(z|Θ = 1)dz
=
1
ln 2
K (J1 + J2) .
(36)
See Appendix B for more details. By substituting (12) and
(35) into (9), we obtain (30).
The resulting equation (30) looks very complicated. How-
ever, it should be pointed out that the gamma function and
Meijer G-function in Theorem 3 are built-in functions that
can easily be computed by standard software packages, such
as Matlab and Mathematica. From (28), it is apparent that
the secrecy capacity will be most influenced by the eaves-
dropper who can overhear the primary transmission in the
best condition. This implies that the use of artificial noise can
increase the secrecy capacity, once at least one eavesdropper
is close to the primary transmitter, and the optimal power
allocation ratio will be determined by the channel condition
of the eavesdropper. On the contrary, in the case that all
the eavesdroppers are far from the primary system, the use
of artificial noise is not effective any more, as discussed in
Corollary 2. These can easily be verified using the generalized
formula (30).
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to verify the
analysis given in Sections III and IV, and discuss the results
in some specific scenarios of cognitive radio networks. In all
the following figures, we set the number of antennas at the
Pr-Tx to M = 3, unless otherwise specified. The average SNR
γpp is set to 20dB, and the average SNR γsp is set to 15dB
except for Fig. 5.
Fig. 2 shows the ergodic secrecy capacity in (16) versus the
ratio of the power φ for several values of P1, in the case that
the Pr-Tx is very far from the Eav. We see that the ergodic
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Fig. 2. Ergodic secrecy capacity vs φ, when γpe = −30dB and P1 ∈
{0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}.
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Fig. 3. Ergodic secrecy capacity vs. φ, when γpe = 30dB and P1 = 0.8.
secrecy capacity does not change as γse changes from −40dB
to 40dB, which supports the claim made in Corollary 1. It is
also seen that the secrecy capacity is the largest when φ = 1,
which corresponds to the case where artificial noise is not
injected. This implies that the use of artificial noise is not
effective when the Pr-Tx is very far from the Eav.
Fig. 3 shows the ergodic secrecy capacity in (22) versus the
ratio of the power φ, in the case that the Pr-Tx is very close to
the Eav. The value of γpe is set to 30dB as in [8]. The results
show that in high γpe regime, the secrecy capacity changes
significantly with γse. We can also find the optimal value of the
power allocation ratio φ that maximizes the secrecy capacity.
For instance, the optimal value of the power allocation ratio φ
are 0.42, 0.45, 0.6, and 0.8 for γse = −20dB, 10dB, 20dB, and
30dB, respectively. Fig. 4 shows the ergodic secrecy capacity
in (22) versus γpp for several values of M , when the optimal
value of φ is adopted. The optimal value of φ has been found
through numerical search. We observe that the ergodic secrecy
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capacity decreases as M increases.
We next illustrate how different channel conditions of mul-
tiple eavesdroppers affect the ergodic secrecy capacity of the
primary system. In Fig. 5, two eavesdroppers are assumed to
be in three different channel conditions for the primary signal.
The channel conditions are represented by a pair of the average
SNR values {γpe,1, γpe,2}, which is set to {30dB, 30dB},
{30dB, 20dB}, and {0dB, 0dB}. First of all, the simulation
results and analytical results show exact agreement, which
verifies the accuracy of our analysis. From the figure, we can
observe that the use of artificial noise is effective for the first
and second cases. Comparing the first and second cases, the
first case attains lower secrecy capacity and lower value of
optimal φ than the second case, since the first case will have
higher chance of overhearing information. Note that lower φ
corresponds to allocating more power to the artificial noise.
In the third case, the secrecy capacity is largest when φ = 1,
which implies that the artificial noise is useless in this case. In
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Fig. 6. Ergodic secrecy capacity vs. the number of eavesdroppers, when
γpe,n = 20dB for all n, γsp = 15dB, φ = 0.5, and P1 = 0.8.
addition, we also illustrate the effect of the secondary system
on the primary system in Fig. 5. As discussed in Remark
1, the results show that the secrecy capacity is reduced by
approximately 1 bps/Hz, when γsp increases from 15dB to
20dB, and the gap increases as φ grows up.
Fig. 6 shows the ergodic secrecy capacity of the primary
system versus the number of eavesdroppers, N , for several
different values of M . We assume that all the eavesdroppers
have the same SNR: γpe,n = 20dB, n = 1, 2, · · · , N . The
secrecy capacity is found to decrease with N , since the
chance of wiretapping will increase for larger number of
eavesdroppers. Similarly to the result in Fig. 4, the secrecy
capacity is shown to increase as the number of antennas, M ,
increases.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed the ergodic secrecy ca-
pacity of the primary system in a cognitive radio network.
As a security provisioning method, we have considered the
combined use of beamforming technique and artificial noise
at the primary transmitter. First, the effect of the secondary
system on the secrecy capacity of the primary system has been
analyzed in two regimes of eavesdropping channel, when only
one eavesdropper is present. We have found that employing
the artificial noise is not effective for a weak eavesdrop-
ping channel. On the other hand, for a strong eavesdropping
channel, it has been found that the power allocation ratio
between the desired signal and artificial noise needs to be
optimized in order to improve the secrecy capacity of the
primary system. Furthermore, we have extended the analysis
to arbitrary eavesdropping channel condition and arbitrary
number of eavesdroppers. It has been found that the use of
artificial noise is effective unless all the eavesdroppers are far
from the primary transmitter. We have also discussed how the
optimal power allocation for the artificial noise is influenced
by the eavesdropping channel condition, interference from
the secondary system, and the number of eavesdroppers.
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Simulations have been used to demonstrate the validity of the
analysis. It is left for future work to find the optimal power
allocation ratio analytically.
APPENDIX
A. PDF of X , Y , and Z
1) PDF of X : The PDF of X can be expressed as
fX (x) = P0fX (x|Θ = 0) + P1fX (x|Θ = 1). (37)
The conditional PDF fX (x|Θ = 0) can be obtained from
X = (φγpe
M
) |ψI |2 when Θ = 0, in which |ψI |2 follows an
exponential distribution, since it is a square of the Gaussian
random variable. Therefore, the conditional PDF is found
as [22, Theorem 3.19]
fX (x|Θ = 0) = M
φγpe
e
− M
φγpe
x
. (38)
Similarly, the conditional PDF fX (x|Θ = 1) can be derived
from X = φ
γpe
M
|ψI |
2
1+γse|hse|
2 when Θ = 1. Let U , φγpeM |ψI |2
and V , 1 + γse |hse|2. Since |ψI |2 and |hse|2 follow the
exponential distribution, fU (u) = Mφγpe e
− M
φγpe
u
and fV (v) =
1
γse
e−
v−1
γse [22, Theorem 3.21]. We first compute the condi-
tional CDF FX (x|Θ0) = Pr
(X = U
V
< x
)
, and then we have
the conditional PDF fX (x|Θ = 1) = d(FX (x|Θ=1)dx given as
fX (x|Θ = 1) = M
φγpe
e
− M
φγpe
x
×
{(
1 +
Mγse
φγpe
x
)−1
+ γse
(
1 +
Mγse
φγpe
x
)−2}
.
(39)
2) PDF of Y: The PDF of Y can be expressed as
fY(y) = P0fY(y|Θ = 0) + P1fY(y|Θ = 1). (40)
The conditional PDF fY(y|Θ = 0) can be obtained from
Y = φ
γpe
M
|ψI |
2
1−φ
M−1
γpe
M
‖ψA‖
2 when Θ = 0. Note that |ψI |2 follows
the exponential distribution, and ‖ψA‖2 is the sum of squared
exponential random variables and thus it follows the Erlang
distribution. Therefore, the conditional PDF fY(y|Θ = 0) is
derived as
fY(y|Θ = 0) = 1− φ
φ
(
1 + 1−φ
φ(M−1)y
)M . (41)
Similarly, the conditional PDF fY(y|Θ = 1) is found as
fY(y|Θ = 1) = α+ (M − 1)η +Mαηy
(1 + αy)
2
(1 + ηy)
M
, (42)
where α , M
φ
γse
γpe
and η , 1
M−1
1−φ
φ
. We can rewrite (42) in
the form of partial fraction expansion as
fY(y|Θ = 1) = A
(1 + αy)
2 +
M∑
k=1
Bk
(1 + ηy)
k
, (43)
where
A = (α− η)
(
1− η
α
)−M
,
Bk = (1− k)(α− η)
(
1− α
η
)−2 (
1− η
α
)k−M
.
(44)
Note that B1 = 0, and thus we get
fY(y|Θ = 1) = A
(1 + αy)
2 +
M∑
k=2
Bk
(1 + ηy)
k
. (45)
3) PDF of Z: From (29), the conditional CDF’s of Z can
be computed as follows.
FZ(z|Θ = 0) =
N∏
n=1
FZn(z|Θ = 0)
=
N∏
n=1
(
1− e− Mφγpe,n z (ηz + 1)−M+1
)
=
N∑
j=0
(−1)j
j!
N∑
n1=1
· · ·
N∑
nj=1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n1 6=n2 6=···6=nj
j∏
t=1
e
− M
φγpe,nt
z
(ηz + 1)
−M+1
=
N∑
j=1
(−1)j−1
N∑
n1=···=nj=1
n1<···<nj
(
1− e−
M
φγ¯pe,j
z
(ηz + 1)
−(M−1)j
)
= 1−
N∑
j=1
(−1)j−1
N∑
n1=···=nj=1
n1<···<nj
e−µjz (ηz + 1)
−(M−1)j
,
(46)
where µj and γ¯pe,j are defined in (31).
FZ(z|Θ = 1)
=
N∏
n=1
(
1− e
− M
φγpe,n
z
[
An
αn (αnz + 1)
+
M∑
k=2
Bk,n
η (ηz + 1)k−1
])
=
N∑
j=0
(−1)j
j!
N∑
n1=1
· · ·
N∑
nj=1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n1 6=n2 6=···6=nj
j∏
t=1
e
− M
φγpe,nt
z
×
[
Ant
αnt (αntz + 1)
+
M∑
k=2
Bk,nt
η (ηz + 1)k−1
]
=
N∑
j=1
(−1)j−1
N∑
n1=···=nj=1
n1<···<nj
(
1− e
− M
φγ¯pe,j
z
j∏
t=1
×
[
Ant
αnt (αntz + 1)
+
M∑
k=2
Bk,nt
η (ηz + 1)k−1
])
= 1−
N∑
j=1
(−1)j−1
N∑
n1=···=nj=1
n1<···<nj
e
−µjz
(
L1(z) +
∑˜
L2(z)
)
,
(47)
where L1(z) =
∏j
t=1
Ant
αnt(αntz+1)
, L2(z) =∏
nu 6={{nt}jt=1∩{ni}ti=1}
Anu
αnu (αnuz+1)
Bk1,n1 ···Bkj,nj
ηj(ηz+1)k1+···kj−j
,
and
∑˜
is defined in (31).
By exploiting Heaviside’s expansion [23], we can express
L1(z) as
j∏
t=1
Ant
αnt (αntz + 1)
=
L1∑
p1=1
rp1∑
q1=1
A1,p1,q1
(z + θp1)
q1 , (48)
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where θp1 are L1 distinct elements of the set {αnt}jt=1 in
the decreasing order, and A1,p1,q1 are the coefficients of the
partial fraction expansion given as [8]
A1,p1,q1
=
1
(rp1 − q1)!
{
∂(rp1−q1)
∂z(rp1−q1)
[(z + θp1)
rp1 L1(z)]
}∣∣∣∣
z=−θp1
.
(49)
Similarly, we can express L2(z) as
L2(z) =
L2∑
p2=1
rp2∑
q2=1
A2,p2,q2
(z + θp2)
q2 , (50)
where
A2,p2,q2
=
1
(rp2 − q2)!
{
∂(rp2−q2)
∂z(rp2−q2)
[(z + θp2)
rp2 L2(z)]
}∣∣∣∣
z=−θp2
.
(51)
If nu = {0}, then L2(z) = Bk1,n1 ···Bkj,nj
ηj(ηz+1)k1+···kj−j
. By differenti-
ating FZ(z|Θ = 0) and FZ(z|Θ = 1) with respect to z, we
arrive at (34).
B. Integrals
1) Derivation of Eq. (20):
Ce|Θ=0 =
∫ ∞
0
log2(1 + x)fX (x|Θ = 0)dx
=
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
eux
1
1 + x
dx
=
1
ln 2
eu
∫ ∞
1
e−uxx−1dx =
1
ln 2
euE1(u),
Ce|Θ=1 =
∫ ∞
0
log2(1 + x)fX (x|Θ = 1)dx
=
1
ln 2
1
1− α
(∫ ∞
0
eux
1
1 + x
dx
+
∫ ∞
0
evx
1
1 + x
dx
)
=
1
ln 2
1
1− α (e
uE1(u) + e
vE1(v)) ,
(52)
where u , M
φγpe
and v , 1
γse
.
2) Derivation of Eq. (27):
Ce|Θ=0 =
∫ ∞
0
log2(1 + y)fY(y|Θ = 0)dy
=
1− φ
φ ln 2
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + y) (1 + ηy)
−M
dy
=
1− φ
φ ln 2
∫ ∞
0
1
η(M − 1)(1 + y) (1 + ηy)
−M+1
dy
=
1− φ
φ ln 2
∫ ∞
1
1
η(M − 1)y (1− η + ηy)
−M+1
dy
=
1− φ
φ ln 2
IM (η),
Ce|Θ=1 =
∫ ∞
0
log2(1 + y)fY(y|Θ = 1)dy
=
∫ ∞
0
log2(1 + y)
A
(1 + αy)
2 dy
+
M∑
k=2
∫ ∞
0
log2(1 + y)
Bk
(1 + ηy)
k
dy
=
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + y)
A
(1 + αy)
2 dy
+
1
ln 2
M∑
k=2
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + y)
Bk
(1 + ηy)
k
dy
=
1
ln 2
(
A lnα
α(α− 1) +
M∑
k=2
BkIk(η)
)
,
(53)
where M > 1, k > 1 and η 6= 0. If η = 1, Ik(η) in (53)
becomes Ik(1) = 1(k−1)2 . Otherwise, if η 6= 1, Ik(η) becomes
Ik(η) = (1−η)
1−k
(k−1)η
[
− ln η +∑k−2i=1 (k−2)!(−η)i(k−i−2)!i!i (η−i − 1)]
based on [24, Eq. (100)].
3) Derivation of Eq. (36):
Ce|Θ=0 =
∫ ∞
0
log2(1 + z)fZ(z|Θ = 0)dz
=
K
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + z)e−µjz (ηz + 1)−(M−1)j−1
× [µj(ηz + 1) + (M − 1)jη] dz
=
K
ln 2
∞∑
k=0
(−1)k
(µj)
k
k!
∫ ∞
0
z
k (ηz + 1)−(M−1)j−1
× [µj(ηz + 1) + (M − 1)jη]G
1,2
2,2
(
z
∣∣ 1,1
1,0
)
dz
=
K
ln 2
∞∑
k=0
(−1)k
µkj
k!
(
µj
Γ ((M − 1)j)
G 2,33,3
(
1
η
∣∣∣∣ −k,1,1(M−1)j−k−1,1,0)
+
(M − 1)jη
Γ ((M − 1)j + 1)
G 2,33,3
(
1
η
∣∣∣∣ −k,1,1(M−1)j−k,1,0))
=
K
ln 2
∞∑
k=0
(−1)k
µkj
k!
1
ηkΓ ((M − 1)j)
×
(
µjG
2,3
3,3
(
1
η
∣∣∣∣ −k,1,1(M−1)j−k−1,1,0)+ ηG 2,33,3 (1η
∣∣∣∣ −k,1,1(M−1)j−k,1,0))
=
K
ln 2
J0,
(54)
Note that the third equality in (54) follows by expressing
the integrand ln(1 + z) in terms of Meijer G-function [25,
Eq. (8.4.6.5)] as ln(1 + z) = G 1,22,2
(
z
∣∣ 1,1
1,0
)
, and express-
ing e−µjz using the Maclaurin series expansion: e−µjz =
0018-9545 (c) 2013 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See
http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI
10.1109/TVT.2014.2359246, IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology
10
∑∞
k=0 (−1)k (µjz)
k
k! . We use [21, Eq. (7.811.5)] to obtain the
fourth equality, and Γ(x+ 1) = xΓ(x) [21, Eq. (8.311.1)] to
get the fifth equality.
Similarly to (54), Ce|Θ=1 can be expressed as
Ce|Θ=1 =
∫ ∞
0
log2(1 + z)fZ(z|Θ = 1)dz
=
K
ln 2
{J1 + J2} ,
(55)
where J1 and J2 are defined in (31).
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